Corporate social responsibility: The disclosure-performance gap by Font, X et al.
Corporate	social	responsibility:	the	disclosure‐performance	gap	
Font, Walmsley, Cogotti, McCombes and Häusler 
Abstract:  
As increased stakeholder pressure requires companies to be transparent about their CSR 
practices, it is essential to know how reliable corporate disclosure mechanisms are, testing the 
gap between corporate social responsibility claims and actual practice. This study 
benchmarks corporate social responsibility policies and practices of ten international hotel 
groups of particular importance to the European leisure market. We found that corporate 
systems are not necessarily reflective of actual operations, environmental performance is eco-
savings driven, labour policies aim to comply with local legislation, socio-economic policies 
are inward looking with little acceptance of impacts on the destination, and customer 
engagement is limited. Generally larger hotel groups have more comprehensive policies but 
also greater gaps in implementation, while the smaller hotel groups focus only on 
environmental management and deliver what they promised. As the first survey of its kind in 
tourism, both the methodology and the findings have implications for further research.  
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1. Introduction		
Despite Friedman’s (1970) view on the limitations of the responsibility of business, the 
notion that businesses have responsibilities beyond providing economic returns to the owners 
of capital is, judging by the profusion of claims by corporations as to their Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) activities (KPMG International, 2008), as well as the discourse around 
CSR in the literature (Carroll, 1999), widely accepted. Nonetheless, the meaning of CSR is 
contested although to aver, as Frankental (2001) does, that because CSR is a vague and 
intangible term it is effectively without meaning is far-fetched. The foundation of CSR is the 
acknowledgement that businesses have responsibilities to society that go beyond shareholder 
wealth maximisation (e.g. Henderson, 2007). This belief is widely held, and hence a degree 
of shared understanding and common meaning exists. 
Some, such as Bendell (2004) and Hess (2008), have argued that the nature of global business 
with its shift in power from the state to supranational corporations has ushered in an era of 
increased corporate accountability, a view further expedited through the multitude of cases of 
corporate fraud and accounting irregularities at the turn of the millennium (e.g. Enron and 
WorldCom). Certainly, the past decade has seen growing pressure on corporations from 
individual consumers, consumer groups, NGOs and governments to take stock of their non-
commercial impact on society. However, businesses’ acknowledgement of the CSR agenda 
does not necessarily result in more responsible behaviour (Hess, 2008, has for example 
questioned to what extent social reporting leads to improved CSR performance, or whether 
conversely it is just a method to avoid additional introduction of regulation)7. Furthermore, it 
is not enough to be responsible, corporations realise that their CSR activities also need to be 
reported, and that transparency in reporting is crucial if companies are to be held to account 
for their actions. 
This study addresses these issues in relation to the tourism industry. Specifically, the study 
set out to investigate to what extent ten global hotel chains’ CSR claims were supported by 
evidence, or whether they were, at worst, mere rhetoric. In other words, this study looks at 
the potential disclosure-performance gap. Publicly available information was scrutinised, the 
hotel chains were given the opportunity to comment on our initial analyses and site visits 
were subsequently conducted to seek corroborating evidence for the companies’ claims. The 
study provides a unique analysis of CSR behaviour and reporting in the tourism industry at a 
time when interest in businesses’ impacts on society is only likely to increase.  
2. Literature	review	 
Reasons for engagement in CSR activities are varied although often it simply comes down to 
seeking competitive advantage, not because of some fundamental moral commitment to 
doing what is right, although Hess (2008) does argues that this should be the ultimate goal of 
CSR. The use of sustainability language and posturing helps the corporation create an 
external, and  to a large extent also internal, image of what the company wants to be seen as- 
in the case of CSR, a caring, nurturing firm. This can be far from the mundane efficiency 
demands of “getting things done” which puts CSR on the backburner.  Nonetheless, while an 
argument can be made that the justification for undertaking CSR does not matter as it is the 
ends that count, it is not unheard of that companies may portray themselves as being 
responsible while they in no way are. Lyon and Maxwell (2011:9) define greenwash as 
"selective disclosure of positive information about a company’s environmental or social 
performance, without full disclosure of negative information on these dimensions, so as to 
create an overly positive corporate image". It might more simply be stated that at the heart of 
greenwashing lie claims that lack substance, the portrayal of something that you are not, a 
deliberate attempt to mislead, or, as Laufer (2003:253) suggests ‘corporate disinformation’. 
Placed in the language of CSR reporting we might call this a disclosure-performance gap. 
If companies are to be held to account for their actions, then transparency in reporting is 
clearly crucial. However, being transparent does not necessarily mean revealing everything as 
this can be counterproductive to the communication of the key message (Bebbington, Gray 
and Owen, 1999).  Consequently, companies must decide how much information to disclose, 
balancing different stakeholders’ needs whereby it is sometimes necessary to disclose 
information that puts the company in a bad light. The ample room for manoeuvre in 
identifying significant impacts and prioritising them  has been partly blamed for the little 
significance behind achieving formal public endorsement for CSR disclosure (Boiral, 2007). 
CSR reporting clearly entails more than relating only positive stories (Kaptein, 2007). 
While there is much agreement on the need to measure and report on CSR activities, how it 
should be measured is less clear and remains a challenging task (Morimoto, Ash and Hope, 
2005). This is not to say that there is a dearth of literature on the subject of measuring CSR as 
Wood’s (2010) recent review established. Alas, comparability of CSR reports stumbles over 
the issue of non-conformity in reporting. This issue has been alleviated to an extent with the 
emergence of standards such as those provided by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), the 
ICC Business Charter for Sustainable Development and specifically in relation to 
environmental management International Standards Organization’s ISO 14001 guidelines and 
the European Union’s Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS). However, even where 
companies use these standards and guidelines this does not prevent questionable reporting 
taking place (Bonilla-Priego and Avilés-Palacios, 2008). Boiral (2007), for example, shows 
how the systems behind ISO14001 certification weren’t a genuine management tool, but a 
mechanism to promote the company’s image- similar to many Spanish hotels certified under 
EMAS (Bonilla-Priego, Najera and Font, 2011). Boiral (2007) continues by arguing that 
certification is often seen as a cumbersome, time and resource consuming system that cannot 
be justified in times of recession. Certainly, that it cannot necessarily be justified for the 
improvements achieved in environmental performance. He reports that environmental 
procedures, central to the management system, were far from being implemented- except 
prior audits, when non conformities were hurriedly reduced as a tidy up job.  Hawkins and 
Bohdanowicz (2011) analyse a range of practices in international hotel groups that show the 
gap between what could be achieved and where most firms are at, despite a clear business 
case for action.  
There is little information in tourism that assesses the state of CSR reporting. It has been 
suggested that industries with a higher pollution propensity are more likely to provide 
discretionary disclosure (Clarkson, Li, Richardson and Vasvari, 2008). Within a single 
industry, firm size (Lang and Lundholm, 1993;Morhardt, 2010), reliance on stock markets for 
investment  (Chatterji, Levine and Toffel, 2009) and equipment age (Healy and Palepu, 2001) 
are determinants of voluntary disclosure. We could therefore expect hotels, being relatively 
low pollution, to be in the early stages of reporting, and for larger hotel groups with publicly 
traded shares to feel greater pressure to report, those with newer buildings (with newer 
cleaner technologies) to have a higher environmental performance and therefore willingness 
to report.  
Similar to our study, Henderson (2007) attempted to research hotel chains’ CSR practices, 
albeit restricted to Phuket in Thailand after the Tsunami of 2004. However, only two hotels 
responded to her request for information forcing a reliance on publicly available information. 
Her findings indicated that the bulk of CSR activity was related to issues that also promoted 
the destination image, i.e. where the CSR activity was not solely altruistic in intent. She also 
acknowledges that to some companies CSR activities are more likely to be engaged with in 
trouble-free times of growing profits (Henderson, 2007). 
Bohdanowicz and Zientara (2009) also undertook an investigation into hotels’ CSR reporting. 
Again, the emphasis was on data available through websites. Their results were somewhat 
ambiguous, with some hotels performing well (e.g. the existence of CSR officers and a CSR 
policy) and others barely doing anything at all. A further study that sought to understand CSR 
reporting (Holcomb, Upchurch and Okumus, 2007) came to some conclusions that contrast 
with those of Bohdanowicz and Zientara (2009). The results of Holcomb et al.’s (2007) study 
were in fact not that different, just the assessment of the hotel industry’s engagement with 
CSR differed. While they agree that CSR is assuming a greater importance for hotel chains, 
they also argue that the message of the importance of CSR has yet to hit home. Hilton and 
Accor came in for praise in relation to their CSR reporting, and in particular Hilton was 
highlighted as being the only hotel chain that permitted an external audit of its CSR reporting. 
Overall, Holcomb et al. (2007) reiterate that little research is available regarding CSR in 
tourism and that “more in-depth studies regarding the reporting of CSR issues” is required. 
Our study addresses this issue. 
3. Methodology	
This study was commissioned by the International Consumer Research and Testing 
organisation on behalf of eight European consumer associations (see acknowledgements). 
These consumer associations pull together resources to commission research on individual 
industries identified as of interest to their members. The recognition by the corporations of 
these consumer associations and the risk of alienating their members ensured participation 
from the majority of hotel chains investigated here.   
The funding organisation’s preference was to select hotel groups with a good offer on leisure 
hotels, with a strong presence in Europe or of importance to European leisure travellers. The 
list of hotel groups was devised in consultation with European tour operators to assess the 
importance to mainstream holidaymakers. The final list covered ten hotel groups, responsible 
for 64 hotel brands (see table 1). Spanish-owned hotels are strongly represented (Sol Meliá, 
RIU, Barceló, Iberostar). This is due to their importance in both the Spanish and the 
Caribbean/Mexican destinations as suggested by the tour operators interviewed for this study. 
The list did not include Wyndham Hotels and Choice Hotels, the two largest groups 
worldwide in terms of bed spaces, due to their primary US focus. In the case of Carlson, 
separate CSR documentation and questionnaires were received for the Americas, Europe, and 
Asia-Pacific as CSR aspects are operated independently.  
*** Insert Table 1 here *** 
A wide range of CSR disclosure indices have been developed (Morhardt, 2010;Unerman, 
2000),  with Wiseman’s study (1982) still being central to many. Most published CSR 
content analyses have collected descriptive data. Occasionally indices have been generated 
but ranking individual companies within a sector has been largely avoided. This is 
understandable given the complexity of indicators as well as their inherent subjectivity 
(Morhardt, 2010). Our index was developed through an analysis of the literature, especially 
drawing on international guidelines and certification programmes for sustainability in 
tourism, the Global Reporting Initiative and preliminary content analysis of CSR reports from 
tourism and hospitality firms. The preliminary list was then evaluated by the CSR, labour, 
environmental management and customer rights’ staff at the different consumer associations 
commissioning this study, and compared against previous studies conducted by them in other 
sectors.  It was decided to drop a number of criteria after further analysis of CSR reports from 
the ten selected hotel groups. The reason for non-inclusion included the inability of the 
indicator to differentiate satisfactorily between the firms, or the absence of realistic means of 
collecting data against the criteria. The attempt of calculating the percentage of hotels in each 
group that meet company policy was dropped due to hotel groups not collecting 
systematically such data for all indicators. Accessibility for customers with disabilities was 
reduced to access for wheelchair users due to the limited practices in most hotels, equally the 
analysis of dietary needs focused on celiac and dropped other food intolerances as well as 
hallal and kosher food.   
In our study, 39 indicators provided evidence for 13 criteria on six different themes with 
weightings as follows: Corporate Policies (10% of the weighting), Labour Issues (20%), 
Socioeconomic Issues (20%), Environmental Issues (25%), Customer Engagement (15%), 
and Transparency (10%). These weightings were discussed and agreed with the consumer 
associations. To illustrate, the theme Corporate Policies covered the following criteria: 
Endorsement of international key conventions, Resources for CSR, Staff training program on 
sustainable issues, CSR management systems, and Independent certification of sustainability 
practices, each with a number of indicators, with their own weightings. As an example, the 
criteria Policy on Social Impacts at the Destination was informed by three indicators 1) 
Monitor any loss of access to natural resource by local communities and formally engage to 
remediate it, 2) No sexual exploitation of children in the hotel properties or by customers 
staying in their properties is a formal engagement of the company, and 3) Support to 
philanthropic or community projects.  
The content analysis of the collected material focused on the type of themes covered and the 
quality/evidence of the claims being made (Clarkson, et al., 2008;Morhardt, 2010). Our 
scoring of sustainability performance follows the principles in Wiseman’s seminal paper, 
without the blanket trust on quantitative scores. Wiseman scored ‘3’ for quantitative 
disclosure, ‘2’ for non-quantitative disclosure, ‘1’ for mentioning in general terms, ‘0’ for no 
disclosure. The score definitions in our study were tailored to each indicator and were the 
result of benchmarking content analysis (see table 2 for an example) from 0 to 5. Our study 
does not differentiate between hard and soft disclosure items (all items would be considered 
hard according to Clarkson’s definition), but the level of strength/reliability of the disclosed 
evidence is included in the item scoring.  
*** insert table 2 here *** 
The emphasis of this study was in particular to evaluate corporate policies and their 
implementation in practice. Staff responsible for CSR in each hotel group were identified and 
approached in June 2010 with a questionnaire to measure the reporting of CSR policies 
against pre-defined criteria. The research team conducted a two month review of all public 
documents found in these hotel groups’ websites (as in Clarkson, et al., 2008;Holcomb, et al., 
2007). Publicly available information not produced by the hotel groups themselves was not 
used in the content analysis unless it could be verified against internal data (e.g. lists of 
signatories of the UN Global Compact, ECPAT, OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises). All data were entered into an Excel spreadsheet with links to the original 
documents to keep trails of evidence. A further column was used to transcribe the results of 
the hotel groups’ questionnaire results against the same indicators, including data from 
internal confidential documents for which confidentiality agreements were signed when 
required. Both sets of data were submitted to the hotel groups in August- the data were 
analysed against score definitions, but neither the scores nor the definitions were sent to the 
company- the purpose was not to see if they agreed on the scoring mechanism, but whether 
the data themselves that formed the basis of the evaluation were correct. Each hotel group 
received only their own data set.  
A further piece of the assessment jigsaw involved visits to a sample of hotels within each 
hotel chain. These were arranged for September 2010. Their purpose was to verify the extent 
to which CSR policies were being applied in practice in individual establishments. All hotel 
groups were visited in at least two countries (apart from RIU who declined to participate). Six 
visits were performed in Thailand, eight in Cancun and eight in Southern Europe (three in 
Nice and five in Mallorca).  Hotel visits took on average eight hours, and were primarily 
conducted in the local language. In Thailand, visits involved at least one night’s stay, usually 
more, while in the remaining destinations the auditor stayed in the same audited hotel for the 
entire period of audits due to limited availability in high season. All stays were paid for by 
the research team and no gifts were accepted to avoid conflicts of interest. Visits included 
interviews with management and staff, walk through assessments, collection of documentary 
evidence as well as a review of minutes of meetings and policy documents. The emphasis of 
these hotel visits was an assessment of compliance with group CSR policies- sustainability 
practices individual to a specific site but outside group policy were noted but not used for 
scoring purposes.  
In October visit results were sent to the companies together with clarification questions, 
mostly where inconsistencies between the policy and the performance were identified. The 
calculations for each indicator were then based on a scoring of the results on a 5-item scale, 
and the validation of the visits in the field from ‘0’-contradicted to ‘1’-fully validated with 
0.5 and 0.75 for partial validations. Not accepting a visit to a hotel equated to a 0 score, 
invalidating the elements of the policy that could only be checked on the ground- Hilton did 
not accept a visit to their Mallorca hotel affecting a percentage of their validation, and RIU 
denied visits to any of their hotels. The field validation was conducted by three researchers 
who were thoroughly briefed on their task, and considerable triangulation prior to scoring 
took place to ensure internal consistency of assessment. Evidence was collected to justify the 
validation in each site and entered in to each company profile. To further strengthen the 
performance index public disputes were examined, i.e. where for example the hotel chain had 
been taken to court and lost the case. The consumer associations emphasised that the research 
team was only to look at corporate behaviour in the last five years. As a result this meant 
excluding resort development aspects from the criteria. Consequently the focus was largely 
on operational aspects. Results were presented to the consumer associations in November and 
the final report submitted in December, with the publication of articles in the consumer 
association magazines taking place in March 2011.  
4. Results	
We first present evidence for the six key themes identified above. The analysis draws initially 
on the ten international hotel groups’ corporate social responsibility policies as documented 
in publicly available sources, responses to the surveys and internal information (table 3). We 
then move on to review how the field visits partly validated certain aspects of the corporate 
policies and procedures (table 4). This then sets the picture for the discussion of results 
against the backdrop of the CSR rankings based on validated disclosure (table 5).  
*** Insert table 3 *** 
Corporate Policies showed endorsement of international conventions that did however not 
translate into evidence at the individual hotel level. Most hotel groups now have a CSR 
nominee in each hotel, these are usually either the chief engineer or the general manager who 
take CSR on as an additional task. There was little evidence that this was a substantial part of 
their roles, judged either on the basis of job descriptions or in terms of their daily routines. 
Environmental training was present in most policies, although the precise meaning of a 
training plan varied considerably between hotels. Evidence of broader CSR training, 
specifically a focus on the socio-economic impacts of the organisation, was extremely 
limited. ECPAT protection for children from sexual exploitation was an exception in this 
regard. Management systems data were collected only for environmental aspects of the 
business’ operation and linked mainly to building management systems. Even these data were 
of variable quality- in some of the hotel groups there was no evidence that this information 
was used to inform decision-making. Overall, the policies were inward looking, with little 
acceptance of the wider impacts caused in the destination.  
The Labour Issues theme reviewed the company’s formal policy on working conditions. This 
included the International Labour Organisation’s Core Convention, remuneration (minimum 
and living wages), discrimination, health and safety, overtime, disciplinary practices, family 
friendly working policies and job stability. Compliance with local legal requirements was the 
standard response when it came to assessing labour issues. There was little transparency in 
the limited published information available on HR issues. This together with the results of the 
survey and internal documentation show that fair employment practices are not integrated 
within CSR strategies.  
Socio-economic Issues focused on sustainable supply chain management policies (local, fair 
trade, eco-labelled products). The analysis showed that the adoption of sustainability 
principles in practice resulted only in a tokenistic impact on purchasing policies.  Measuring 
and managing social impacts at the destination was also limited- while only Marriott and 
Intercontinental have policies on monitoring loss of natural resources. As mentioned, most 
groups were signatories of ECPAT’s code against child sexual exploitation, yet few have 
developed operating procedures to deal with it (Barceló was the exception). All groups had 
well established philanthropy programmes. 
Environmental Issues covered in companies’ policies dealt primarily with issues of energy 
and water management. Hilton Europe (not elsewhere) has a well documented programme 
with metrics (Bohdanowicz, Zientara and Novotna, 2011), similar to those in Accor, Marriott, 
Intercontinental, Sol Meliá and Starwood. The substantial savings that these groups are 
achieving through energy and water efficiency programmes are however not ring-fenced to 
flow into CSR budgets. Health and safety justifications tend to prevail whenever there is any 
perceived conflict between conspicuous consumption and safeguarding scarce resources (for 
example promoting the use of disposable plastic glasses near pools as glass should not be 
used, while dismissing the use of washable toughened plastic glasses). Solid waste 
management is being implemented primarily through local government pressure (but has not 
gone upstream, hotels are not asking their suppliers to reduce the packaging coming into their 
businesses). There is some evidence of water re-usage and liquid waste filtration but not 
widespread- these are experimental in newer buildings or in sites where grants were 
available. The policies to preserve biodiversity are poor (Accor, Carlson Europe and 
Intercontinental perform best here) but all companies fail on implementation. When carbon 
footprint monitoring occurs, it is an extension of the energy management policy, and the 
calculations are of in house emissions only, i.e. the do not include supply chains.  
Customer Engagement comprised issues around accessibility, dietary provision and 
involvement of customers in sustainability programmes. Very little is done on accessibility 
beyond legal compliance.  The same principle applies to dietary requirements. The need for 
celiac provision, for example, is dealt with by a buffet approach to food management and 
limited specific products available by prior order. The approach to engaging customers might 
best be summed up under the motto: “Do not disturb”. Even such basic issues as recycling, let 
alone more complex information about how to behave responsibly is largely avoided (the 
policies from Accor, Carlson Europe and Asia-Pacific, Intercontinental and Marriott go 
further than those of the other groups, although this does not of course guarantee 
compliance).   
The Transparency issue was rated on the basis of cooperation with the survey (only Accor, 
Barceló, Carlson Europe and Sol Meliá responded by the deadline while others collaborated 
more reluctantly, after some further exhortation) and the quality of the CSR report- Carlson 
Europe, Intercontinental, Marriott, and Sol Meliá had Global Reporting Initiative-checked 
reports. While useful as a complementary tool to an external form of assurance, the GRI 
Check confirms the completeness and correctness of a report’s content index and as such is 
not an external audit of what a company says it does. 
4.1. The	disclosure‐performance	gap	
It is one thing to have a policy; it is another to adhere to it. For this reason, site visits were 
conducted that revealed the following. Site visits demonstrated some investment to meet 
sustainability requirements, some ritualised behaviour for the benefit of the visit, and some 
evidently inappropriate practices contradicting policies. Table 4 presents the percentage of 
the companies’ policies and procedures that were invalidated through the hotel visits. The 
hotel group with the highest policy scores was also the most consistent in implementation, 
whereas the second and third in consistency of implementation (Barceló and Iberostar) had 
some of the poorest initial policy scores. Intercontinental and Marriott, with the second and 
third most comprehensive policies and internal systems, were the least consistent in 
implementation (RIU aside). Hilton would have fared considerably better had they not denied 
participation of one hotel. RIU data distort averages for they had no disclosure on some 
criteria, or in those where they had some policies these could not be checked on site as the 
group denied participation.  
*** Insert table 4 *** 
The greatest disclosure/ performance gaps were identified in the categories Environmental 
Issues and Customer Engagement. This is in part down to relative ease of assessment of these 
issues. To a degree this can also be attributed to the fact that companies had higher disclosure 
results in the first place, as well as more ambitious policies. In other words, there were more 
chances of not entirely fulfilling these policies given their exacting nature.  
Most Labour Issues policies were driven by compliance with legislation. It is not surprising 
that the disclosure/performance gap was therefore small, and any additional sustainability 
practice such as contracting staff with difficulties of accessing work was anecdotal and could 
not be attributed to the company policy but was circumstantial or the result of government 
incentives. In Socio-Economic Issues, sustainability purchasing practices regularly fell below 
the stated policy’ claims.   
It is worth remembering that several Corporate Policy and all Transparency indicators were 
checked with documentary evidence from group headquarters and not in the field, hence 
lower disclosure/ performance gaps for these items prevailed. The Corporate Policy 
indicators with disclosure/ performance gaps related to the provision of staff training in social 
sustainability, and maintaining social sustainability systems (despite having achieved already 
poor disclosure scores, performance was worse). The equivalent training and systems for 
environmental aspects was more consistent with corporate policies.  
While during most visits we saw policies not being entirely fulfilled, there was also evidence 
of CSR practices that exceeded policy requirements. Individual hotel practices that went 
beyond the corporate policy and metrics were captured less often, and mainly as case studies 
in the internal organisation’s magazines or on notice boards on the intranet. The presentation 
of case studies in the corporate social reports, evident in earlier CSR posturing (Laufer, 
2003), was less common- the disclosure/ performance gap was 15%, or 13% if we remove 
RIU. In this sense it could be argued that many of the policies were only partly representative 
of individual hotel practices, and in some places hotel groups were conservative in choosing 
to make public data that could be open to scrutiny.  
5. Discussion	
Table 5 brings together the evidence from the previous two tables into a single weighted 
ranking of CSR practices that forms the basis of the following discussion.  
*** Insert table 5 *** 
As Accor came out on top in CSR policy as well as performance and disclosure it also ranks 
first in the overall assessment of companies’ CSR performance. Sol Meliá who come in on 
second place overall scored poorly on the disclosure-performance gap (Table 4). Marriot who 
scored third overall on CSR policy scored a poor ninth in terms of the disclosure-performance 
gap and yet still achieved an overall position of third in the ranking. Does this mean that the 
disclosure-performance gap should have been more heavily weighted, for example? Of 
course, there is no unequivocal answer to this question. We recognise that the measurement 
of social phenomena is fraught with difficulties and yet the data and their analysis bring home 
the point that relying solely on company claims in an assessment of CSR performance is 
highly suspect. Transparency in reporting and external assessment raises the bar in terms of 
ensuring the disclosure-performance gap is reduced. Thus, while other studies have provided 
useful data on tourism companies’ CSR claims (Bohdanowicz and Zientara, 2009;Holcomb, 
et al., 2007), this study illustrates that strong claims are not necessarily indicative of strong 
performance.  
Terrachoice (2009) reports that the most commonplace manifestation of greenwashing are 
hidden tradeoffs in environmental claims- the sin of focusing on a single green attribute 
which is not necessarily the most significant for the product and that deflects attention from 
other issues. There is a sense of organisational hypocrisy when the simplest eco-efficiency 
tasks can be dressed up as “save the planet” campaigns (Laufer, 2003) as found in hotel 
groups that went no further than energy and water management with short payback periods 
on initial investments (Hawkins and Bohdanowicz, 2011). In this regard we can say we found 
greenwashing in the emphasis placed on ecosavings-related environmental performance 
criteria, primarily energy and water management, while other more complex criteria such as 
biodiversity conservation are generally ignored or at best taking second stage. Nonetheless, 
the situation does appear to have improved since Holcomb et al. (2007) conducted their study 
when almost the entire CSR emphasis was on philanthropy, and environmental management 
played a very small role in CSR communications.  
Previous evidence that firms with better environmental performance have better disclosure 
(Clarkson, et al., 2008) could only be partly validated although it seems reasonable to assume 
that a positive relationship exists. Thus, according to  Lyon and Maxwell (2011), greener 
firms are more likely to fully disclose in situations of increased threat of punishment from 
greenwashing if they have to date a largely positive record in this respect. This was the case 
in particular for Marriott and Sol Meliá, both high performers in the rankings who fully 
engaged in disclosing internally confidential information (Marriott provided near 100 internal 
documents of substantial value as evidence for CSR policy implementation). Greener firms 
albeit with a mixed record (high performers in some areas but with negative performance in 
others) are likely to clam up and avoid public disclosure (greenhushing). This is in 
accordance with Lyon and Maxwell’s (2011) view of greenwashing that suggests that activist 
pressure deters greenwash but also encourages greenhushing for fear of becoming a target by 
sticking your head above the parapet. Keeping a low profile minimises the risk of being 
targeted for closer scrutiny. The clear assumption behind Lyon and Maxwell’s view is that 
greenwash will be punished so it is better to greenhush as this runs a lower risk of scrutiny.   
On the issue of greenhushing it is worth noting that when RIU were approached to participate 
in the study they asked not to be included in the sample on the grounds that, due to it not 
being a listed company, they did not have a CSR report, and furthermore, did not feel they 
had sufficient time to engage with the project. The hotel group continued to decline any 
participation over six months, in the knowledge that this would place them at the bottom of 
the rankings and that publicly available information would still be included for analysis. 
RIU’s behaviour may be termed rational on the basis of Lyon and Maxwell’s proposition if 
RIU’s actual CSR performance is weak. Low sustainability performance would mean any 
disclosure would still place them at the bottom of the ranking; therefore it makes sense to 
simply not disclose any information. This does not mean however that poor CSR 
performance will inevitably lead to non-disclosure. Barceló is a case in point. Its behaviour 
corresponds to the “informed browns” profile (Lyon and Maxwell, 2011), by collaborating 
with the research despite their low performance to gain points through transparency: “it gains 
a lot from trumpeting a success, and loses little by withholding information about a failure 
(because it is already expected to fail)” (2011:21). Ultimately, whether to disclose or not to 
disclose is a judgement call as to how firms believe consumers will respond. Evidence in this 
area is still scant. 
We found evidence that large firms disclose more, but there is no conclusive evidence of 
whether this is based on the fact that this has lower information production costs (Clarkson, et 
al., 2008), or that they feel greater legitimization pressure to do so (Hawkins and 
Bohdanowicz, 2011).  Size has to a certain extent been a constraint, not an advantage, in 
corporate reporting- Carlson sent separate responses for their three divisions (Europe, 
Americas and Asia-Pacific) with considerably different policies, and Hilton Europe is ahead 
of the rest of the Hilton Group. When visiting the hotels it was apparent that many locally 
relevant practices could only be reported up to group level, but not become group policy, for 
not being transferable- to a certain extent group policies tend to go back to the lowest 
common denominator. There is furthermore evidence that firms with greater capital 
expenditures disclose more (but firms with newer production plant do not disclose more, 
against expectations) (Clarkson, et al., 2008)- in our study this would be true of hotel groups 
that own most of their branded hotels, whereas franchise hotels have substantially poorer 
practices, an issue that deserves further research.  
Finally, Legitimacy Theory, which associates extent of disclosure with level of threat to a 
firm’s social legitimacy (Patten, 2002), would explain some of the attempts for soft 
disclosure (e.g. Iberostar, Barceló) as self serving disclosures to appease stakeholders by 
providing some form of data. It would be erroneous to believe however that all soft disclosure 
is simply posturing. For example, Iberostar's EMAS certification of most of its Spanish hotels 
(30% of its hotel plant) may be judged more than hiding behind a façade. In Iberostar’s case 
the weakness lies in the lack of company-wide policies or systems, the lack of coordinated 
structure, and being limited to environmental aspects only.  
6. Conclusions	
The picture of CSR performance is a mixed one. While on the whole discrepancies between 
policy and performance exist, in some cases considerable discrepancies, in others CSR 
activities in fact exceeded policy requirements. Non-adherence to policy does not 
automatically therefore mean weaker CSR performance at the level of the individual hotel, it 
means not following company standards. We would argue that having been able to assess the 
implementation of policy on the ground has added a valuable extension to previous work in 
the field. While content analyses of hotel chains’  CSR claims have been undertaken 
(Bohdanowicz and Zientara, 2009;Holcomb, et al., 2007), this study has shown just how 
important external audits are. Without these audits, companies are free to engage in 
greenwashing and greenhushing, and, on the basis of this study’s data, readily do. KPMG’s 
(2008)  survey of CSR reporting has indicated that large corporations are increasingly willing 
to provide evidence for the claims they make in their CSR policy commitments, and indeed 
undergo external audits. The trend for increased CSR reporting is clear. Hotel chains will not 
be able to extricate themselves from this trend and the justification of the unwillingness of 
some chains to participate in this study on the grounds that CSR is a voluntary activity rings 
hollow.  
Moreover, the study has provided evidence that strength of CSR engagement varies by 
theme. There was a strong emphasis on environmental issues, most notably energy and water 
management. These are also areas where immediate cost savings can be gained. This issue 
aside, many CSR policies simply reiterated legal requirements. On the basis of Carroll’s 
(1979) taxonomy of reasons for CSR engagement, hotel chains’ largely avoid anything that 
does not benefit the business immediately. As such they adhere to Friedman’s (1970) view of 
the responsibilities of the firm which is a responsibility to the business (its owners) first and 
foremost, albeit within legal requirements of course. The exception here are philanthropic 
gestures such as corporate donations although here too benefits to the bottom line are created 
if these acts of giving are widely publicised leading to a strengthening of brand image and 
reputation. Another important insight from the study is that the focus on CSR was largely 
inward looking. There was little regard for impacts on the destination or on establishing 
sustainable supply chains. Ironically, hotels being physically tied to the destination are more 
reliant on its wellbeing than many other sub-sectors of the tourism industry (UNWTO, UNEP 
and WMO, 2008). 
More work needs to be done on creating robust indices and rankings, and yet the difficulties 
in assessing compliance with policy should not be used as an excuse to avoid comparisons of 
companies within the same sector. There were some very clear differences between hotel 
chains’ claims, engagement and performance. This is indicative of a lack of maturity in 
embedding CSR within corporations. Some hotel chains still have much catching up to do if 
they want to be on a par with the leading firms. If the pressure on businesses to take 
responsibility for their wider impacts on society continues to grow, then the catch-up game 
becomes all the more critical. 
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Table 1. Hotel groups and brands 
ACCOR 
INTERNATIONAL 
Sofitel, Pullman, Novotel, Mercure, Adagio, Suite Novotel, Ibis, 
All Seasons, Etap Hotel, Hotel F1, Motel 6, Studio 6 
BARCELO HOTELS & 
RESORTS 
Barceló 
CARLSON GROUP Radisson, Country Inns&Suites, Park Inn, Park plaza, Regent 
HILTON Hilton, Hilton Garde Inn, Homewood suites Hilton, Hilton Grand 
vacations, Waldorf Astoria, Conrad, Double Tree, Embassy Suites 





Intercontinental Hotels & Resorts, Crowne Plaza, Holiday Inn, 




Marriott Hotels & Resorts, JW Marriott, Renaissance Hotels, 
Edition Hotels, Autograph collection, Courtyard, Residence Inn, 
Fairfield Inn & Suites, TownePlace Suites, SpringHill Suites , The 
Ritz-Carlton 
RIU HOTELS Riu 
SOL MELIÁ Sol Hoteles, Meliá, Tryp, Grand Meliá, Paradisus Resorts, Me, 
Innside by Meliá 
STARWOOD 
HOTELS&RESORTS 
Le Meridien, Four points, Westin, The Luxury collection, Aloft, 
Sheraton, Element, St. Regis, W Hotels 
  
 
 Table 2.  Scores definition for indicator 7. Human resources dedicated to CSR/sustainability 
in each hotel (FTE staff / total FTE staff) 
0= no information/no response to the questionnaire 
1= No dedicated CSR position or only generic coordinator in some hotels 
2= named person only for hotels involved in Environmental MS 
3= Generic person dedicated and/or GM Responsible/possibly team or Committee 
4= No dedicated CSR position but GM is Responsible and different position and/or 
Environmental committee 
5= Responsible Coordinator at each property and Responsible Business Team (employees 
from different functions and all levels of the organisation). 














































































ACCOR  72  79 73 100 95  94  86 1º 
BARCELÓ  43  50 45 70 62  82  59 7º 
CARLSON  56  79 76 74 82  65  72 5º 
HILTON  53  35 46 82 35  68  53 8º 
IBEROSTAR  21  3 47 50 50  61  39 9º 
INTERCONTINENTAL  59  82 77 91 66  96  79 2º 
MARRIOTT  50  65 83 98 81  96  79 3º 
RIU  0  0 18 70 29  12  22 10º 
SOL MELIÁ  61  68 83 94 59  100  78 4º 
STARWOOD  54  79 50 95 56  78  69 6º 
Average per Section  47  54 60 82 62  75  64   
Source: authors 













































































ACCOR  2  0 3 8 22  0  6 1º 
BARCELÓ  4  0 1 21 26  0  9 2º 
CARLSON  10  2 10 11 34  0  11 5º 
HILTON  10  23 14 35 38  0  20 6º 
IBEROSTAR  7  13 23 25 21  0  15 3º 
INTERCONTINENTAL  13  0 14 37 42  0  18 8º 
MARRIOTT  6  0 9 36 37  0  15 9º 
RIU  0  0 24 99 66  0  31 10º 
SOL MELIÁ  4  2 26 25 23  0  13 7º 
STARWOOD  9  0 8 15 33  0  11 4º 
Average per section  7  4 13 31 34  0  15   
Source: authors 














































































ACCOR  70  79 63 92 74  94  79 1º 
BARCELÓ  41  50 44 55 46  82  53 7º 
CARLSON  50  77 68 65 54  65  63 5º 
HILTON  48  27 39 53 22  68  43 8º 
IBEROSTAR  20  3 36 38 40  61  33 9º 
INTERCONTINENTAL  52  82 66 57 39  96  65 4º 
MARRIOTT  47  65 75 63 51  96  66 3º 
RIU  0  0 14 1 10  12  6 10º 
SOL MELIÁ  58  67 62 71 46  100  67 2º 
STARWOOD  49  79 46 81 37  78  62 6º 
Average per section  43  53 51 58 42  75  75   
Source: authors 
 
